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18 November 2026

Post-quantum transition: towards a well-managed cryptographic posture

Frédéric Noyer, Head of Cybersecurity at SPIE ICS

Blog 3 Transition post quantique

The current landscape and expectations under FINMA Guidance 05/2026, along with the first steps towards greater crypto-agility. 

The question is no longer whether organisations need to prepare, but how they should structure the transition.

Quantum risk is no longer just a research topic. With the publication of FINMA Guidance 05/2026, it has become a matter of concrete governance, risk management, and resilience. For organisations whose data, transactions or infrastructure must be protected in the long term, the real issue is no longer whether they need to prepare, but how to structure the transition. 

A technological shift that organisations need to anticipate 

Our digital economy is built on cryptography. It protects our communications, financial transactions, digital identities, infrastructure, and sensitive data. 

However, much of this trust currently relies on cryptographic mechanisms that could be undermined by the arrival of sufficiently powerful quantum computers. FINMA identifies RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic-curve-based algorithms as being vulnerable to quantum attacks. 

No cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists yet, and nobody can say with certainty when this capability will become available. This is precisely one of FINMA's key messages: uncertainty about the timescale must not lead to inaction. While technology continues to advance, a cryptographic migration across a large organisation requires significant coordination and careful handling of many interdependencies, and takes time. 

At the same time, however, the standards needed to begin this transformation now exist. In August 2024, NIST published its first three post-quantum cryptography standards: FIPS 203/ML-KEM for key establishment and FIPS 204/ML-DSA and FIPS 205/SLH-DSA for digital signatures. NIST recommends that organisations begin migrating to these standards. 

Does an organisation know its current dependence on cryptography well enough to be able to change it when the time comes?

FINMA Guidance 05/2026: a particularly strong signal for the Swiss market 

On 9 July 2026, FINMA published its Guidance 05/2026 on quantum computing. It draws in particular on a survey of 60 Swiss financial institutions, including banks, insurers, managers of collective investment schemes and financial market infrastructures. 

The results reveal a significant gap between awareness and actual preparedness. 72% of the institutions surveyed said they had not yet planned or begun implementing any measures. Only 8% had a concrete roadmap for quantum-resistant encryption. 

FINMA recommends in particular: 

  • a strategy approved at senior management level; 
  • a PQC roadmap with milestones, priorities and deadlines; 
  • an analysis of cryptographic risks; 
  • an inventory of cryptographic usage; 
  • the identification and prioritisation of critical data requiring long-term protection; 
  • the development of crypto-agility; 
  • consideration of external service providers and supply chain dependencies. 

Another significant point: FINMA calls on the institutions concerned to have a PQC roadmap in place by mid-2027 at the latest. For the Swiss financial sector, the topic has therefore moved beyond technological forecasting. It has become a matter of governance and risk management. 

The risk exists even before “Q-Day” 

It might be tempting to wait until a quantum computer capable of attacking today's cryptographic mechanisms actually exists. This reasoning, however, overlooks a key risk: Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL). 

The principle is simple: encrypted data can be intercepted and stored today with the aim of decrypting it later, once sufficient quantum capability becomes available. FINMA explicitly requires this scenario to be taken into account in the risk analysis and recommends prioritising the protection of information that must remain confidential over the long term. 

This issue is particularly important when the value or sensitivity of information extends well beyond its current period of cryptographic protection: financial information, sensitive personal data, intellectual property, strategic information or communications requiring long-term confidentiality. 

The right starting point is not the hypothetical date of Q-Day, but how long the data needs to remain protected.

A PQC transition is first and foremost a transformation programme 

Replacing a cryptographic algorithm is not comparable to applying a simple software update. 

Cryptography is deeply embedded in information systems: TLS and VPNs, PKI and certificates, digital signatures, authentication mechanisms, applications, infrastructure, cloud environments, storage, key management and third-party solutions. FINMA requires the analysis to cover applications and infrastructure, whether operated in-house, outsourced or consumed as a service. 

It is this cross-cutting nature that makes the exercise complex. The first challenge is therefore not necessarily to replace the cryptography. It is often to know exactly where it is used, how it is used and what it depends on. 

1. Establish governance 

A transformation on this scale requires clear sponsorship and governance involving cybersecurity, IT, architecture, risk, business units, procurement and supplier management. Scope, responsibilities and criticality criteria must be defined. New cryptographic requirements should gradually become decision criteria for architectures, development, investment and supplier relationships. 

2. Build the cryptographic inventory and understand your exposure 

This means discovering where cryptography is used and building an actionable view of algorithms, protocols, certificates, keys, communications and dependencies. For FINMA, this analysis must result in a complete inventory of cryptographic processes, covering in particular the encryption of communications and stored data, digital signatures, key management and authentication mechanisms. The inventory must then be maintained to reflect the organisation's actual situation. In our approach, it forms a kind of Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM). 

3. Analyse risks and set priorities 

Not all cryptographic assets have the same level of exposure. They need to be assessed according to service criticality, data sensitivity and lifespan, the algorithms used, technology and supplier dependencies, and the need to guarantee confidentiality, integrity, authentication or non-repudiation over the long term. Only with this knowledge can an organisation build a migration path that is realistic, prioritised and economically manageable. 

The key to the transition: mastering your cryptographic posture 

One of the most interesting findings of the FINMA survey concerns the importance attached to cryptographic inventory and crypto-agility. 76% of the institutions surveyed believe that an inventory of cryptographic processes delivers high or very high added value, and 73% consider crypto-agility important or very important. 

This reflects a fundamental shift. The real goal is not simply to complete a migration to PQC. It is to build the capability to manage the organisation's cryptographic posture over the long term. 

Crypto-agility is precisely this ability to replace cryptographic algorithms when needed, without a far-reaching overhaul of the architecture. FINMA recommends designing this capability into future systems and applications. 

The key questions you need to be able to answer 

  • What cryptography do we use? 
  • Where is it used? 
  • Which business service depends on which algorithm, certificate or protocol? 
  • Which elements are vulnerable or obsolete? 
  • Which data must remain confidential long enough to be exposed to the HNDL risk? 
  • Which suppliers determine our ability to migrate? 
  • How do we measure our progress towards readiness? 

From a static inventory to continuous cryptographic posture management 

At SPIE ICS, we see a one-off inventory as the starting point, not the end goal. 

The complexity and constant evolution of systems increasingly require the ability to discover cryptography, put it in context, identify cryptographic policy violations and track PQC readiness. 

Our Cryptographic Posture Management approach makes it possible to collect cryptographic information from different sources, correlate it and put it in context so that it can be mapped to the applications and services concerned. The risks and gaps identified can then be consolidated to assess readiness for the PQC transition. 

Turning cryptography from a set of scattered technical components into a measurable, manageable security posture.

Beyond banking: an issue for all critical activities 

FINMA Guidance 05/2026 is naturally aimed at the institutions it supervises. But the technical issues it describes do not stop at the boundaries of the financial sector. 

Cryptography protects communications, identities, systems and data in many environments. The issues concern banks and insurers, but also critical and industrial infrastructure, where management and control communications may involve energy, transport or water networks, embedded systems or ICS/SCADA systems. 

For sectors such as energy, industry, public administration, defence and critical infrastructure, the lifespan of systems and the need to protect certain information for many years make early action particularly relevant. 

Don't wait until migration becomes urgent to start understanding your cryptographic exposure.

SPIE ICS: supporting the transition, from strategy to crypto-agility 

At SPIE ICS, we treat the post-quantum transition as a strategic cyber resilience programme, not just a technology replacement. 

Our methodology follows a structured path: governance and scoping, cryptographic inventory and risk analysis, development of the strategy and roadmap, followed by pilots, migration of priority environments and the gradual retirement of mechanisms that are no longer fit for purpose. 

  • understand exposure to quantum risk; 
  • identify crypto-assets and their dependencies; 
  • analyse the Harvest Now, Decrypt Later risk; 
  • define PQC governance; 
  • set transformation priorities; 
  • build a crypto-agility roadmap; 
  • address suppliers and external dependencies; 
  • put continuous cryptographic posture management in place. 

The time to start is now 

The post-quantum transition will not be completed in a few weeks. That is precisely why it needs to start before technological urgency forces the issue. 

FINMA highlights the complexity and duration of these migrations, the interdependencies with service providers and the fact that the Harvest Now, Decrypt Later risk already exists. It also plans to actively monitor developments in this area and give the topic greater weight in its supervisory activities. 

The first step is therefore not necessarily to replace RSA or ECC immediately. The first step is to know where you stand: take inventory, understand, assess and prioritise, then build the capability to evolve. 

This is how an organisation can gradually move from cryptography that has accumulated over time and is often difficult to map to a well-managed, crypto-agile cryptographic posture that is ready for the post-quantum era. 

Are you PQC-ready? 

SPIE ICS supports organisations that want to assess their level of preparedness, understand their exposure to quantum risk and structure their transition programme. 

Contact our experts for an initial discussion. We will present our methodology for the transition to post-quantum cryptography and our Cryptographic Posture Management approach. This enables you to inventory, analyse and manage your cryptographic posture over time. 

Building tomorrow's digital trust today.

 

Discover our quantum transition approach

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